This injunction is clearly unconstitutional. But Judge Hayes knows that, right? She's read the following cases, I trust. Or is it possible that she simply doesn't understand constitutional law?
Evans v. Evans: Appellate Court Throws Out Prior Restraint
May 13th, 2008
by Sam Bayard
Citizen Media Legal Project
Yesterday, a California appellate court struck down a brazenly unconstitutional preliminary injunction prohibiting two defendants from making "false and defamatory statements" about, or publishing the "confidential personal information" of, Thomas Evans, a deputy sheriff in San Diego. The case, Evans v. Evans, 2008 WL 2009669 (Cal. Ct. App. May 12, 2008), involves a nasty post-divorce dispute between Thomas Evans and his former wife, Linda Evans, and her mother, Shirley Preddy. Linda and Preddy allegedly posted false statements about Thomas on various websites, filed complaints about him with his employer, and published confidential information from his medical and financial records on the Internet. The lower court granted Thomas a broad preliminary injunction against their alleged misconduct, without specifying any particular forbidden statements or defining what "confidential personal information" means.
The appellate court held that the preliminary injunction was an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech, and that it was unconstitutionally vague because it failed to alert Linda and Preddy as to what conduct would violate the court's order. The case itself is relatively prosaic; it is interesting largely because it demonstrates yet again just how unfamiliar many lower court judges are with basic First Amendment principles. Beyond that, it tells us two important things about California law relating to prior restraints:
1. The venerable principle that courts cannot enjoin alleged defamation before trial still holds despite the Calfornia Supreme Court's decision in Balboa Island Village Inn, Inc. v. Lemen, 40 Cal.4th 1141 (2007). Not a huge surprise. According to Evans, Balboa means only that a court may order a defendant not to make certain specific statements found at trial to be false and defamatory.
2. A court has more leeway to prohibit the publication of private personal information than to prohibit publication of allegedly false statements... the lower court would be "fully justified" in prohibiting the disclosure of Thomas's telephone number, address, and Social Security number on the Internet, especially because he is a police officer...
BALBOA ISLAND ALLOWS COURTS TO ISSUE PRIOR RESTRAINTS ONLY FOR SPECIFIC STATEMENTS THAT HAVE BEEN FOUND TO BE DEFAMATORY
Courts can prohibit repetition of defamatory speech
May 2, 2007 ·
Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press
The California Supreme Court ruled last week that it is constitutional for courts to issue limited injunctions prohibiting defendants from repeating statements that were determined at trial to be defamatory.
The ruling arose from a case where the defendant, Anne Lemen, vocally criticized and protested the noise and activities occurring at a bar, the Balboa Island Village Inn, close to her home.
According to the court's majority opinion, Lemen told the neighbors that there was child pornography, drug dealing, and prostitution going on in the Village Inn. She also videotaped customers and made derogatory comments to employees.
In October 2001, the Village Inn sued Lemen for nuisance, defamation and interference with business, and sought a court order against Lemen.
The trial court agreed with the Village Inn and granted a permanent injunction prohibiting Lemen from contacting the inn's employees; from repeating certain defamatory statements, including that the bar "acts as a whorehouse" and "encourages lesbian activities"; and from filming within 25 feet of the Village Inn. The order applied not just to Lemen but also "her agents" and "all persons acting on her behalf."
The appeals court overturned most of the injunction...
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